Two Russians go on trial this week, accused of orchestrating anti-government protests, running a sophisticated disinformation campaign, and attempting to interfere in next year’s presidential election—a case that threatens to expose the shadowy reach of Kremlin-linked operatives deep in southern Africa.
Igor Ratchin, a political consultant, and Lev Lakshtanov, a translator with ties to Angola dating back to the Soviet era, face 11 charges, including terrorism, espionage, and influence peddling. Their arrests last August have pulled back the curtain on a network prosecutors say is linked to Africa Politology—a shadowy group of operatives and intelligence officers that emerged from the now-defunct Wagner Group.
The Russians’ lawyers challenge the indictment as lacking “concrete and objective facts.” But the prosecution’s case, obtained by the BBC, paints a picture of a coordinated operation aimed at changing Angola’s political course—and sending a warning to a nation drifting away from Moscow’s orbit.
The Shadow Network
According to prosecutors, the operation began in 2024 when a team of Russian operatives arrived in Luanda under the pretext of opening a Russian cultural center—a project that never materialized.
Among them was Maxim Shugalei, a prominent Wagner-linked political operative sanctioned by the European Union for overseeing disinformation campaigns. Shugalei’s activities in Africa were turned into a film trilogy sponsored by Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, who died in a 2023 plane crash.
Shugalei has denied knowing the defendants. But prosecutors allege he was part of a network that rotated operatives in and out of Angola throughout 2024 and 2025, making payments to local journalists and experts to disseminate propaganda aimed at “provoking political change.” The payments totaled over $24,000.
The Campaign
The prosecution’s indictment cites a series of publications it says were part of the disinformation campaign.
In January 2025, a Facebook page mimicking a recognized local news site—calling itself satirical—warned that Angola could be drawn into the Ukraine war. In December 2024, the same page criticized the Lobito Corridor, a Western-backed rail project moving minerals from central Africa to Angola’s ports, claiming foreign firms gain near-total access to the country’s resources.
A day later, the same article appeared on another website, speculating whether Angola had “signed a pact with the Devil” by joining the project.
Prosecutors say the goal was clear: undermine trust in Western partners and discredit President João Lourenço’s foreign policy.
The Money and the Meeting
The indictment names two Angolans who will also face trial: sports journalist Amor Carlos Tomé and political activist Francisco Oliveira. Both are accused of helping the Russians conduct their activities.
But the most explosive allegations involve senior political figures.
Prosecutors claim Ratchin and Lakshtanov met with MPLA heavyweight General Higino Carneiro and Unita leader Adalberto Costa Junior—both regarded as potential presidential candidates in next year’s election. The Russians allegedly offered Carneiro up to $15 million in campaign support, along with security assistance, strategic advice, and intelligence gathering.
Carneiro has not responded to requests for comment. Unita representatives called the allegations “false” and suggested the case is being used for political purposes.
The Protests
Last July, Angola saw its deadliest protests since the end of a civil war in 2002. What began as a peaceful taxi drivers’ strike in Luanda quickly grew into nationwide unrest that turned violent. At least 29 people died, and more than 1,200 were arrested.
The prosecution alleges the defendants orchestrated the protests, citing notes and photos found on their phones. Ratchin’s lawyers say he took photos for safety reasons, to have evidence if he were attacked.
Many Angolan journalists and activists strongly contest the idea that the protests weren’t organic. With the World Bank estimating that nearly 40% of Angolans live below the international poverty line of $3 per day, the unrest had clear economic roots.
“People were protesting because of their living conditions, not because someone from another country told them to,” said Sheila Nhancale, Angola researcher at Human Rights Watch.
A Flawed Indictment?
The case has drawn criticism for its inconsistencies. The indictment states the Russian operation began on October 9, 2024, with Shugalei’s arrival—but Shugalei was arrested in Chad on September 19, 2024, and returned to Moscow on November 16.
Legal experts say the prosecution’s key challenge will be to show that the acts listed form a deliberate pattern of subversion.
Rui Verde, a research associate at Oxford University’s African Studies Centre, told the BBC: “The key challenge for the prosecution will be to show that the acts listed in the indictment form a deliberate pattern, a kind of intentional roadmap to subversion.”
The Kremlin’s Silence
If convicted, the Russians could be sent back to their homeland. But Moscow appears in no hurry to intervene.
A source close to the Russian diplomatic community told the BBC: “The logic is simple: these people were not carrying out official state tasks, they were just contractors. Russia’s position in the country is already weak, so there’s no point making things worse.”
“Let these remnants of Prigozhin’s operation sort it out themselves,” the source said.
What Comes Next
The trial begins March 24. For Angola, the case is a test of whether it can hold foreign operatives accountable while balancing relations with a Kremlin that has watched whether it can hold foreign operatives accountable while balancing relations with a Kremlin that has watched the country drift toward the West.
For the Russians, it’s the country’s drift toward the West.
For the Russians, it’s a test of whether they were “amateurish idiots,” as one a test of whether they were “amateurish idiots,” as one former Prigozhin associate described the operation, or whether their arrest exposes a deeper Russian effort to destabilize a strategic African nation.
For the Angolan public, the question is simpler: were last July’s protests the work of foreign provocateurs, or a spontaneous cry, as a former Prigozhin associate described the operation, or whether their arrest exposes a deeper Russian effort to destabilize a strategic African nation?
For the Angolan public, the question is simpler: were last July’s protests the work of foreign provocateurs, or a spontaneous expression from a population living on $3 a day?
