West African nations have agreed to activate a regional standby force to combat waves of violence by cross-border armed groups that have turned the Sahel into the “global epicenter of extremism.”
The decision was made last week at a days-long security meeting of military chiefs of the Economic Community of West African States in Sierra Leone. The bloc met at a time when the region faces what experts call an “existential security threat” that has killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands.
The plan calls for mobilizing an initial 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026 to tackle armed groups expanding their territory and sharpening their tactics across the region.
Why Now
The numbers tell the story. More than half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024 occurred in West Africa and the Sahel. From January to June 2025 alone, the region recorded 12,964 conflict-related fatalities in 5,907 incidents — nearly all of them in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
Armed groups ideologically linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group have routinely attacked military outposts and civilian settlements from Mali to Nigeria. Countries are responding, but in a fractured manner.
The threat is no longer confined to the Sahel. Fighters are increasingly pressing into coastal states such as Togo and Benin, where they have already launched attacks. In one incident last December, the standby force supported Benin’s military to prevent rebels from seizing power.
“If you look at the geographic spread, the violence is spilling south,” said Beverly Ochieng, a Dakar-based analyst with the intelligence firm Control Risks. “Coastal nations like Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are now directly in the crosshairs.”
What Is the ECOWAS Standby Force
The ECOWAS Standby Force was officially formed in 1999, though it began deployments in the early 1990s as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, known as ECOMOG. It includes thousands of military, police, and civilian staff contributed by member states.
The force has been crucial in ending several conflicts in the region. From 1990 to 2003, ECOMOG was instrumental in ending protracted civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, engaging in combat — unlike typical United Nations peacekeeping missions — though troops faced criticism for rights violations as they struggled to differentiate rebels from the larger population.
During the Ivorian civil war from 2002 to 2003, the force intervened as a peacekeeping mission. It also helped stabilize Mali during the 2012-2013 crisis following a Tuareg rebellion and Islamist takeover. More recently, in 2017, the troops helped force longtime Gambian President Yahya Jammeh to step down and hand over power to Adama Barrow, whom he had lost an election to.
The standby force is largely regarded as the first successful attempt at establishing a regional security alliance in Africa. Southern and East African states later created their own forces in 2007 and 2022, respectively.
A New Kind of Threat
The proposed activation would specifically respond to threats posed by ideological armed groups — the first time the force would face such groups as opposed to political rebels.
This is a very different enemy. Armed groups now operate across porous borders, using heavily forested areas as hideouts and corridors. They have targeted major urban areas, including a January attack on Niamey’s international airport. They use more sophisticated weapons. And an al-Qaeda-linked faction has blocked fuel supplies from reaching Mali’s capital, Bamako, since September, crippling mobility and essential services.
The groups often secure local support by collecting taxes, providing resources like fertilizer, building mosques, or promising security in areas where governments are absent.
The Major Armed Groups
At least eight groups are active across the region.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, is the main al-Qaeda-allied faction. Formed in 2017, it operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. The group, which has an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 members, is currently blockading Bamako.
The Islamic State Sahel Province, formed in 2015, operates in Niger and Mali. It claimed responsibility for the January attack on Niamey’s airport and has more than 400 fighters.
Boko Haram originated in Nigeria’s Borno State in 2010 and is notorious for kidnapping more than 300 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. The group spread to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Although severely weakened since the death of its leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2021, it is still operating with an estimated 1,500 fighters.
The Islamic State West Africa Province broke off from Boko Haram due to differences over how to treat Muslim civilians. It mainly operates in northeastern Nigeria and is believed to have 3,500 to 5,000 fighters.
Ansaru, another Boko Haram splinter group now linked to al-Qaeda, operates in northern Nigeria and has cooperated with criminal gangs to kidnap people for ransom. It kidnapped foreigners from the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Italy, France, and Greece between 2011 and 2013, executing most of them. The group has about 2,000 to 3,000 members.
Lakurawa, whose alliances remain unclear, is believed to have arrived from Mali and operates in northwestern Nigeria. It was the focus of United States Christmas Day airstrikes last year and is believed to have about 1,000 fighters.
The Challenges
If ECOWAS plans to deploy troops, it faces two major challenges: funding and the rift that caused military-led Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso to split from the bloc in January 2025 to form their own Alliance of Sahel States.
Nigeria typically provides 75 percent of personnel to ECOWAS missions and has been a major funder. But the country’s economy is struggling after high inflation in 2023, and its defense forces are stretched thin combating multiple armed actors across the country. Possible alternative funders include the United States, which has been working with Nigeria since December, and France, which is increasingly close to Abuja.
All three Alliance of Sahel States countries are at the heart of the armed groups crisis, with several groups operating along their shared borders. They exited ECOWAS and officially banded together in 2025, turning away from France and toward Russia, which has deployed about 2,000 fighters — initially from the Wagner Group and now from the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps.
ECOWAS has tried to persuade them to return through mediator states like Senegal, which maintains friendly ties with the Sahelian nations. The bloc has also maintained an open-door policy by inviting them to meetings. But the military leaders have proved to be hardliners and have shunned those approaches.
The alliance is working on building its own 6,000-man combined force and wants to prove that it can compete with ECOWAS by successfully combating armed groups. A close collaboration where both sides deploy and fund a single regional force may not happen in the near term.
“Because when the alliance left, one of their criticisms was that ECOWAS did not support counterterrorism and was overly focused on politics and elections,” Ochieng noted. If ECOWAS continues to build on the friendly ties maintained by Senegal, Ghana, and Togo, there could be room for intelligence sharing, joint surveillance, and joint missions in the long term.
What Comes Next
The ECOWAS deployment is a belated response to a crisis that has been building for years. The plan includes mobilizing 2,000 soldiers by the end of the year — a modest force given the scale of the threat.
But experts say military force alone will not solve the problem.
“Those challenges will persist, but they’ll also have to think about this as not just a military response but a holistic operation that’ll include social interventions to halt the influence of these groups that allows them to recruit members,” Ochieng said.
The groups thrive in areas where governments are absent, providing services and security that states fail to deliver. Until that changes, no number of troops will be enough.
